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Abstract In this study, a novel multiparty quantum sealed-bid auction proto-
col using the single photons as the message carrier of bids is proposed, followed
by an example of three-party auction. Compared with those protocols based
on the entangled states (GHZ state, EPR pairs, etc.), the present protocol
is more economic and feasible within present technology. In order to guaran-
tee the security and the fairness of the auction, the decoy photon checking
technique and an improved post-confirmation mechanism with EPR pairs are
introduced respectively.
Keywords Multiparty quantum sealed-bid auction · single photons · decoy
photon checking technique · post-confirmation
1 Introduction
Due to the principles of quantum mechanics, such as no-cloning theorem, un-
certainty principle, and entanglement characteristics, quantum system shows
a lot of advantages than classic ones. In the past decades, quantum mechan-
ics has been applied to various fields, including quantum key distribution
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(QKD)[1,2], quantum secret sharing [3,4], quantum secure direct communi-
cation [5-7], quantum private comparison [8-12], quantum voting [13, 14] and
quantum sealed-bid auction (QSA).
The auction is one of the basic businesses in e-commerce, and it has wide
potential application in some complex distributed systems, such as social net-
work[15], cloud computing[16,17], and wireless sensor networks[18,19]. Usually,
the auction consists of one auctioneer and several bidders, all bidders submit
their own bids to the auctioneer, and then the auctioneer will determine who
is the winner. A secure auction must guarantee the privacy of every bid’s mes-
sage and the fairness among the bidders. To be specific, (1) any bid cannot be
known by others before the auctioneer publishes it; (2) the auctioneer cannot
help any bidder to win the auction through changing his/her bid.
In 2009, Naseri [20] proposed the first quantum sealed-bid auction proto-
col based on GHZ states, in which the GHZ states were also utilized to check
the security of the quantum channel. However, Qin et al. [21] and Yang et al.
[22] respectively pointed out that the malicious bidder can launch the dou-
ble controlled-NOT attack or use fake entangled particles to cheat the other’s
secret bids, and then they fixed the problem by adding decoy photons be-
sides GHZ states for checking eavesdropping. At the same time, other remarks
and improvements on Naseri’s protocol have also been reported [23,24]. In the
above QSA protocols [20-23], the auctioneer is considered to be honest. But,
in practice a malicious bidder may collude with a dishonest auctioneer to win
the auction, which results in damaging the fairness of the auction. In order to
solve this problem, in 2010, Zhao et al. [25] improved Naseri et al.’s protocol
[20] by introducing a post-confirmation mechanism using the single photons.
Since then, other researchers [26-28] further improved the post-confirmation
mechanism to resist some special collusion attacks among the bidders or be-
tween the bidders and the auctioneer. On the other hand, in 2010, Wang [29]
proposed a new QSA protocol based on a set of order EPR pairs, in which,
the two legitimate bidders can encrypt their respective secret message through
performing two unitary operations, and deduce the opposite party’s bid after
the auctioneer received all the particles and finished the Bell measurement.
In 2014, Liu et al. [30] found that in Wang’s protocol a malicious bidder can
launch the Twice-CNOT attack to obtain the other’s bid, or the dishonest
auctioneer may collude with one bidder and help him/her win the auction by
changing his/her bid. To resist these two attacks, they applied a hash func-
tion method into a post-confirmation mechanism and adopted a QKD key to
encrypt the bids.
All above QSA protocols [20-30] are based on the entangled states (GHZ
state or EPR pairs). To the best of our knowledge, no such QSA protocol
utilizing the single photons has been reported. As we all know, the GHZ state
or EPR pairs is more difficult to be prepared in experiment than the single
photon. In this study, we take the single photons as quantum resource, and
propose a novel economic and feasible multiparty quantum sealed-bid auc-
tion (MQSA) protocol among N parties. In the present protocol, the decoy
photon checking technique is adopted to guarantee the privacy of every bid’s
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message, i.e., a malicious bidder or a group of malicious bidders cannot get
other’s bid. In addition, we improved the post-confirmation mechanism based
on EPR pairs by adding a permutation operator before the EPR sequence is
transmitted, which is used to ensure the fairness of the auction.In comparison
with the previous protocols [20-30], this protocol has its own other advantages
except that single photon is easier to be prepared than GHZ state or EPR
pairs. The auctioneer is only required to carry out the simpler single-particle
measurement instead of the Bell-basis or GHZ-basis measurement. The bids
can be directly encrypted into single-particles without being encoded by QKD
in advance. The security checking of the quantum channel only uses the decoy
photon checking technique without consuming any GHZ states, thus saves the
consumption of quantum resources.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the whole process of the
present MQSA protocol among N parties is presented in Section 2. For con-
venience, an example of the three-party auction is given in Section 3. Finally,
the security and efficiency are analyzed respectively in Section 4, following the
discussion and inclusion in the last section.
2 Multiparty quantum sealed-bid action protocol using single
photons as message carrier
Suppose the auction consists of one auctioneer (Alice), and N -1 bidders (Bob,
Charlie, ..., and Zach). Without loss of generality, suppose the bidders’ bi-
nary messages have the same length, and the form of messages is lmj =
{l1j , l2j , l3j , ..., lmj }, where lmj denotes the m-th binary bit of the message of the
j-th bidder, m presents the length of the binary messages, and lmj ∈ {0, 1}, j =
1, 2, ..., N − 1. The whole procedures of our MQSA protocol are depicted as
below,
Step 1. All parties agree that bidders can perform the two unitary oper-
ations I, iσy to encode one bit classic information[31], where:
I =|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
iσy =|0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|.
(1)
Step 2. The auctioneer Alice generates N − 1 groups m-length qubits
randomly in one of {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}, and noted them as Pj(j = 1, 2, ..., N−1).
At the same time, Alice selects K × (N − 2) (K is the detection rate) decoy
photons from {|+〉, |−〉, | + y〉, | − y〉} and inserts randomly k decoy photons
into Pj , respectively,
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉),
|+ y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉), | − y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉).
(2)
Now, Pj is transformed into a new sequence P
′
j . Alice sends P
′
j to every bidder
j.
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Step 3. All bidders confirm that they have received sequence P
′
j , then,
Alice and bidder j perform the eavesdropper checking of quantum channel
as follows. (i) Alice announces the positions and the corresponding MB (in
the two sets of measuring basis (MB), say {|+〉, |−〉} and {| + y〉, | − y〉}) of
the decoy photons in P
′
j . (ii) Bidder j measures decoy photons in sequence
P
′
j according to the information published by Alice. (iii) Bidder j announces
the measurement results. (vi) Through comparing the measurement results in
public, they complete the error rate analysis. If the error rate is zero, they
continue to next step, otherwise they abandon their transmission.
Step 4. After checking the security of quantum channel, the leftover qubits
are the sequence Pj . Each bidder encrypts his bid lj on Pj according to this
rule: if lmj is 0, the bidder performs I operation on P
m
j , otherwise, the bidder
performs iσy operation on P
m
j . The sequence Pj is transformed into sequence
P
′′
j .
Step 5. For 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, bidder j prepares ordered sequences of EPR
pairs R
′
ji = {r1ji, r2ji, ..., rm/2ji }(i = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, j 6= i) according to his (her)
secret bid, where rgji ∈ {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |ϕ+〉, |ϕ−〉}(g = 1, 2, ...,m/2) and that
classical bits “00”, “01”, “10”, “11” are encoded to states |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |ϕ+〉,
and |ϕ−〉, respectively. Then, bidder j applies permutation operators Πj(m) on
R
′
ji to create a new sequence Π
j
(m)R
′
ji = R
′′
ji and transforms the sequence
R
′′
ji into new sequence Rji through inserting m decoy photon states selected
randomly from {|+〉, |−〉, | + y〉, | − y〉} randomly into R′′ji. Finally, the new
sequence Rji is sent to bidder i. Bidders j and i adopt the decoy photon
checking technique to guarantee the security of transmission. After that, the
leftover qubits are the sequence R
′′
ji.
Step 6. Each bidder j sends the sequence P
′′
j back to Alice. Since Alice
knows the initial state of Pj , she will measure every qubit in P
′′
j by utilizing
corresponding MB. If the state of qubit has changed, the information is 1, oth-
erwise the information is 0. Obviously the winner can be determined according
to the highest bid. Alice announces the highest bid and candidate winner.
Step 7. For resisting Alice’s maliciousness, the winner (for example the j-
th bidder) announces the permutation operator Πj(m). Then the other bidders
recover the correct orders of R
′
ji usingΠ
j
(m) and perform the Bell measurement
on the corresponding EPR pairs in the sequence. The fairness of the auction
will be guaranteed when all the measurement results are the same as the bid
which Alice announced, otherwise the auction is considered to be unfair.
As described above, the whole procedures can be divided into two parts:
Steps 1-4 and 6 introduce the auction process among the bidders and the
auctioneer; and the post-confirmation process is given in Steps 5 and 7. In
next section, we will give an example of the three-party QSA protocol.
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Fig. 1: The process of three-party quantum sealed-bid auction protocol. (a)
Bob (Charlie) encrypts his or her bid into the single photons P1 (P2)
prepared by Alice, and sends them back to Alice, here, UB, UC ∈ {I, iσy},
P1
UB−−→ P ′1 represents Bob applies the unitary operation UB on the particle
sequence P1 to form P
′′
1 , so does P2
UC−−→ P ′2. (b) The post-confirmation
mechanism based on EPR pairs by adding a permutation operator is
executed, here, Π14 denotes a permutation operator, R
′
1,2
Π1
4−−→ R′′1,2 represents
Bob performs Π14 on EPR sequence R
′
1,2 to form R
′′
1,2, so do R
′′
1,2
Π1
4−−→ R′1,2
and R
′
2,1
Π2
4−−→ R′′2,1, and BM represents measurement basis.
3 An example: three-party quantum sealed-bid auction
For the sake of clearness, an example is given to explicitly describe a three-
party quantum sealed-bid protocol based on single photons. Suppose the auc-
tioneer is Alice and there are two seller agents, Bob and Charlie. And Bob’s bid
is 1011, Charlie’s bid is 0111. For simplicity, we skip the decoy photon checking
process on quantum channel; the major process consists of the following five
steps (also shown in Fig. 1):
Step I. Alice generates 2 groups 4-length qubits randomly in one of {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉},
i.e., P1 = |0〉|1〉|+〉|−〉, P2 = |+〉|0〉|−〉|1〉. Then Alice sends P1 to Bob and P2
to Charlie.
Step II: Bob and Charlie encrypt their bids on the respective sequence of
quantum particles according to the encoding rule. After that, P1 is transformed
into the sequence P
′′
1 = |1〉|1〉|−〉|+〉 and P2 to P
′′
2 = |+〉|1〉|+〉|0〉.
Step III. Bob (Charlie) prepares an ordered sequence of EPR pairs R
′
1,2 =
|ϕ+〉12|ϕ−〉34 (R′2,1 = |ψ−〉12|ϕ−〉34) according to his (her) secret bid, and
applies a permutation operatorΠ1(4) (Π
2
(4)) on the sequence R
′
1,2 (R
′
2,1) to form
the sequence R
′′
1,2 (R
′′
2,1). The order of sequence R
′′
1,2 (R
′′
2,1) is 1324 (4123). Bob
(Charlie) sends R
′′
1,2 (R
′′
2,1) to Charlie (Bob) and P
′′
1 (P
′′
2 ) to Alice.
Step IV. After Alice received P
′′
1 (P
′′
2 ), she chooses the corresponding
MB ({|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉}) to measure every qubit in P ′′1 (P
′′
2 ). Then she
compares the measurement results with the initial states, which follows the
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rule: if they are different, the corresponding binary bit is 1; otherwise, the
binary bit is 0. So she gets two binary sequences, i.e., 1110 (Bob’s bid) and
0100 (Charlie’s bid). Obviously, Bob’s bid is higher than Charlie’s. Then Alice
will announce that the winner is Bob, and the highest bid is 1110.
Step V. Since the auctioneer Alice announces the result, other bidders
will perform a post-confirmation mechanism to verify the reality of the win-
ner. At first, Bob tells Charlie Π1(4), then Charlie applies it on the disordered
sequence R
′′
1,2 and gets the original ordered sequence: R
′
1,2 = Π
1
(4)R
′′
1,2, i.e.,
|ϕ+〉12|ϕ−〉34. After that, she performs the Bell measurement on the EPR pairs
sequence R
′
1,2, then she gets Bob’s bid, i.e., 1011. Since the bid obtained by
Charlie is the same as that one announced by Alice, so we can say the auction
is fair and effective.
Up to now, the three-party example which describes the present MQSA
protocol is introduced completely. The security analysis for the new protocol
will be given in the next section.
4 Security and efficiency analysis
4.1 Security analysis
The crucial issue of any quantum sealed-bid auction is its security. It must
guarantee the privacy of every bid’s message and fairness of the auction among
the bidders. To be specific, it must follows the rules [30], (i) the outer eaves-
droppers cannot get any information about bids; (ii) any bidder or a group of
bidders cannot obtain bid message from other bidders; (iii) a malicious bidder
may collude with the dishonest auctioneer but cannot win over all the other
bidders.
(1) Outsider attack
Similar to Refs. [27,28,30], the decoy photon checking technique is adopted
to resist the outer eavesdroppers’ attacks, such as the intercept-and-resend
attack, disturbance attack and the attack with fake entangled particles, which
is proven to be effective to prevent outer eavesdroppers from stealing the bids.
Here, we take the intercept-and-resend attack as example to check the se-
curity against outsider eavesdroppers’ attacks. In the present protocol, the
eavesdropper Eve may launch this attack during the process Alice sends P
′
j
to every bidder j in Step 2 and/or the converse process every bidder j sends
the sequence P
′′
j back to Alice in Step 6. As described in Step 2, Alice inserts
the decoy photons, namely detection photons,into Pj and gets new sequence
P
′
j , then sends P
′
j to every bidder. At this time, Eve may intercept the trans-
mitted sequence P
′
j and make some measurements on them, and tries to steal
the original states of Pj Alice prepared. For avoiding being detected by the
participants, she will continually send the measured P
′
j or new single photon
sequence to each bidder. Here, since Eve does not know the positions of detec-
tion photons in P
′
j , she cannot differentiate the detection photons and Pj . If
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she make some measurements on P
′
j , it will inevitably increase the error rate in
Step 3, that means the eavesdropping will be found. Secondly, Pj is prepared
randomly from {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} and the measurement bases are unknown for
Eve, she cannot get any information through measurement operations. Ac-
cording the description in Step 5 and 6, the converse process is similar to
the above process. so, we can say the present protocol is secure against the
intercept-and-resend attack.
(2) Insider attack
Suppose a malicious bidder may launch CNOT attack [21,22] to obtain
the bid of the j-th bidder. Before auction begins, she (he) prepares a set of
auxiliary particles Se. In Step 2, She (He) will intercept the quantum sequence
Pj sent by Alice, perform a CNOT operation on every particle in Pj and the
corresponding auxiliary particle in Se and resend Pj to bidder j. When in Step
3 Alice and bidder j perform the eavesdropper checking of quantum channel,it
is easy to found that the states of checking qubits in Pj are disturbed. Then
the protocol will be abandoned. For example, auxiliary particle is |0〉e, and
checking qubits are generated randomly in one of {+〉, |−〉, |+ y〉, | − y〉}. The
relationship between the initial composite system, which consists of the check-
ing qubit and the ancilla, and the one after CNOT operation is listed in Table
1. From Table 1, we can see the states of the checking qubits are disturbed, so
this CNOT attack can be detected. By now, we have proved that the malicious
bidder cannot get other’s bid without introducing any error.
(3) collusion attack
There are two types of collusion attack: (1) auctioneer Alice may collude
with a malicious bidder and help him/her win this auction; (2) many bidders
collude with each other to get the bid of the honest bidder. If the auctioneer
wants to help a malicious bidder to win the auction successfully, he may falsely
claim the winner is that malicious bidder under the case that the winner is
one of others in Step 6. But it must be noted that Step 5 and Step 7 introduce
a post-confirmation mechanism to check the reality of the winner. In Step
5, all bidders prepare the sequences of EPR pairs according to their bids
and send them to others. In Step 7, after auctioneer announces the winner is
the j-th bidder, other bidders can measure EPR pairs in sequence R
′
ji sent
by the winner. If the measurement result is different from that announced
by Alice, obviously, the collusion of the dishonest bidder and the malicious
auctioneer can be found, then, this auction is abandoned. Now we consider
another collusion attack among the dishonest bidders. For launching collusion
attack successfully, the dishonest bidders may try to measure EPR pairs in
R
′
ji to get the j-th bidder’s bid (suppose he or she is honest) after checking
the security of the channel in Step 5. However, since they are disordered by
the permutation operator before the sequences of EPR pairs R
′
ji are sent to
other bidders in Step 5, the correct positions of EPR corresponding pairs are
unknown to anyone except the sender. Under this circumstance, any bidder
cannot get sender’s bid through measuring EPR pairs. So our protocol also
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Table 1: The relationship between the initial composite system and the one
after CNOT operation
Auxiliary
qubit
Checking
qubit
Composite sytem(initial) Composite system(after CNOT)
|0〉e |+〉
|
∧1〉 = |+〉c|0〉e
=
1√
2
(|00〉ce + |10〉ce)
|
∧2〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉ce + |11〉ce)
=
1√
2
(|++〉ce + | − −〉ce)
|0〉e |−〉
|
∧1〉 = |−〉c|0〉e
=
1√
2
(|00〉ce − |10〉ce)
|
∧2〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉ce − |11〉ce)
=
1√
2
(|+−〉ce + | −+〉ce)
|0〉e |+ y〉
|
∧1〉 = |+ y〉c|0〉e
=
1√
2
(|00〉ce + i|10〉ce)
|
∧2〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉ce + i|11〉ce)
=
1√
2
(|+ y〉c|+〉e + | − y〉c|−〉e)
|0〉e | − y〉
|
∧1〉 = | − y〉c|0〉e
=
1√
2
(|00〉ce − i|10〉ce)
|
∧2〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉ce − i|11〉ce)
=
1√
2
(|+ y〉c|−〉e + | − y〉c|+〉e)
can resist against the collusion among several dishonest bidders to get other
bids.
(4) Side channel attack
Our protocol has been considered and discussed in the idea settings. In
practical scenario, the quantum protocol inevitably suffers from some side
channel attacks. Since our protocol transmits the same photons more than
once, it may suffer from the Trojan horse attacks(also called invisible photon
attacks), and such kind of quantum transmission has been discussed [32,33].
To prevent this type of attacks, the participants can install a special quantum
optical device such as the wavelength quantum filter and the photon number
splitters (PNS) to detect an attack. According to Refs. [32, 33], Eve’s invisible
photons can be filtered out by using the wavelength quantum filter, and the
PNS can split each legitimate photon to discover the delay photons. If there is
an irrational high rate of multi-photon signal, then the attack can be detected.
As pointed out in Ref. [32], this kind of Trojan horse attack is not an exploit
of a weakness of the protocol in itself, but rather an exploit of a weakness
in certain imperfect implementations. Without the imperfection of the single-
photon detectors, this kind of Trojan horse attack will not exist any longer.
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4.2 Efficiency analysis
As analyzed above, the present MQSA protocol suffices for three security re-
quirements [30]. That is to say, it guarantees the privacy of every bid’s message
and fairness of the auction among the bidders.
In addition, the efficiency is another outstanding advantage in our MQSA
protocol. In Refs. [20-28], the GHZ states are utilized as the bid message
carrier, where every 3-qubit GHZ state can transmit two classic bits (cbits)
bid message. Taking the quantum consumption rate ξ (the amount of qubits
every transmitted cbit bid message) into account, the quantum consumption
rate in Refs. [20-23,25-28] is ξGHZ = 3/2 = 1.5. While in Refs. [29, 30],
one EPR pairs (2-qubit) is employed to transmit two cbits bid message, so
the rate ξEPR = 2/2 = 1.0. And in our MQSA protocol, one single photon
(1-qubit) is used to transmit one cbit bid message, so ξOur = 1/1 = 1.0.
The comparison among these three kinds of QSA/MQSA protocols is listed
in Table 2. As shown in the table, the quantum consumption of our protocol
Table 2: The comparison among different kinds of QSA or MQSA protcols
protocol
quantum resource
(qubit)
bid message
(cbit)
quantum consumption
rate ξ (qubit/cbit)
detection quantum
state
Refs.[20-23,25-28]
GHZ
(3 qubits)
2 cbits 3/2=1.5
GHZ[20−22],
EPR pairs[23],
single photon[25−28]
Refs.[29,30]
EPR pairs
(2 qubits)
2 cbits 2/2=1.0
EPR pairs[29] ,
single photon[30]
our protocol
single photon
(1 qubit)
1 cbit 1/1=1.0 single photon
is the same as the protocols [29, 30] using EPR pairs, but obviously lower
than the protocols [20-23,25-28] using GHZ states. On the other way, taking
the detection quantum state into account, we can find our protocol takes the
single photon as the detection quantum state as the same as Refs.[25-28,30],
which saves more qubits than Refs.[23, 29] using EPR pairs and Refs.[20-22]
using GHZ state (shown in the last column of Table 2).
As we all know, the single photon is viewed to be easier to be prepared in
the current technology than the entangled states, such as EPR pairs, the GHZ
state. Since we employ the single photons as the message carrier, it shows our
protocol is more feasible and economic than those protocols[20-23,25-30] based
on entangled states.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
In conclusion, different from those protocols using entangled states as quantum
resource, we proposed a novel MQSA protocol using single photons as message
carrier. In the protocol, the decoy photon technique is used to defeat against
outsider attack, insider attack and collusion attack, while an improved post-
confirmation mechanism employing EPR pairs and a permutation operator is
introduced to guarantee the fairness of auction. Compared with other QSA or
MQSA protocols, our protocol can save the quantum consumption, and shows
more efficient as well as feasible in the current technology.
It should be noted that the EPR pairs are still used in the post-confirmation
process while the single photons are utilized as the bid carrier to implement the
process of the auction. There are some interesting open problem to be solved.
Is the entangled state necessary in the post-confirmation mechanism? And is
there any other kind of feasible method to guarantee the fairness instead of
the post-confirmation mechanism? On the other hand, how to generalize our
multiparty quantum sealed-bid auction into the random d -dimension scenario
is our another work to be further studied in the future.
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